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1 Introduction
How are a consumers attitudes towards income risk a¤ected when her trading
opportunities get restricted because of quantity constraints, such as having
to work full-time while wishing a part-time job (or vice versa), or being
stuck with a small car, when in need for a large one? I consider two types
of attitude towards risk: (i) risk aversion and (ii) prudence or downside risk
aversion. The Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient of risk aversion measures a consumers
willingness to pay for disposing of any zero mean risk. Likewise, Kimballs
coe¢ cient of prudence indicates the certain reduction in income required to
bring the marginal utility of consumption in line with the expected marginal
utility of consumption when a zero mean risk is added.1
First intuition suggests that quantity constraints make a consumer both
more risk averse and more prudent, since they reduce the opportunity set
and thus allow for smaller adjustments of the consumption bundle after the
income risk has realised. Consider, e.g., the case where the utility function
over consumption (c) and leisure (`) is u(c; `) = v(c) + `, with v0; v000 > 0
and v00 < 0. Because preferences are quasi-linear, all exogenous income risk
of a worker (with spare time) is absorbed by leisure. Since also the utility
function is linear in leisure, the consumer is risk neutral with respect to this
income risk and exhibits zero prudence. But if she faces a binding quantity
constraint on her labour supply, the exogenous income risk is absorbed by
the consumption of other goods, whose marginal utility is strictly falling and
convex. Hence, the quantity constraint turns the consumer into a strictly
risk averse and prudent person with respect to income risk.
This intuition, however, tells only part of the story. When it comes to
risk aversion, the e¤ect of a quantity constraint can be decomposed in two ef-
fects. The rst is what I call the price risk e¤ect (PRE): had the constraint
on labour supply been only weakly binding (i.e., under certainty, notional
labour supply coincides with the quantity constraint), then risk aversion goes
up because small income shocks now have to be absorbed by consumption
alone, any adjustment through leisure being ruled out. I will propose to
think of a quantity constraint as turning income shocks into (compensated)
1Since the solution to the consumers decision problem under uncertainty will satisfy
a condition on the expected marginal utility of consumption, the optimal response to
changes in the zero mean risk will depend on the sign and size of the prudence coe¢ cient.
Hence, this coe¢ cient measures the propensity to prepare or forearm oneself in the face
of uncertainty(Kimball, 1990, p 54). While prudence was originally dened in a tem-
poral context (savings decision), the notion of downside risk aversion is often used in the
atemporal context. For brevity, I use prudence thoughout in the paper.
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price shocks: when a consumer experiences a positive income shock but can-
not expand consumption of a particular good, then it is as if she is suddenly
facing a higher price for that good (a virtual price) while at the same time
her income is increased to make the new bundle (but with the same quantity
of the constrained good) t into the budget (a virtual income). Hence, the
presence of a constraint means that the nominal income risk is (i) turned
into a virtual income risk and (ii) amplied by an virtual price risk. Be-
low, I show that the PRE adds a positive ordinal term to the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion (RR) that depends positively on the income elasticity
of the constrained good and its importance in the consumers budget, and
negatively on its compensated price elasticity. Graphically, the PRE mark
up is due to the fact that consumers indirect utility function in terms of
income is the upper envelope of the constrained indirect utility function. If
the former is concave, the latter must be even more concave. This part of
the story squares with intuition.
But what happens if the quantity constraint gets tighter, e.g., when the
quota of what you are allowed to purchase of a good or the amount of labour
you manage to supply gets striclty smaller than the optimal amount under
certainty? I show that four e¤ects will take place: (i) an income e¤ect on
RR (because a tighter constraint makes a person worse o¤), (ii) a relative
price e¤ect on RR (because a tighter constraint a¤ects the virtual price),
(iii) a scale e¤ect on RR (because we are interested in the risk premium as
a fraction of mean nominal income, not virtual income), and nally (iv) an
e¤ect on the size of the PRE (mainly because the budget share is a¤ected).
I call the sum of these four e¤ects the endogenously changing risk aversion
e¤ect (ECRAE) because it picks up what happens when the consumer is
forced to move along the budget line. Its sign and size is an empirical issue.
Hence, if a consumer is initially constrained at the optimal demand under
certainty, the ECRAE following a change in the quota may enforce the PRE
or it may go in opposite direction. In the last case, the consumer may even
turn less risk averse than when unconstrained. A similar decomposition
applies for the e¤ect on relative prudence. The PRE now pertains to the
change in curvature of the marginal utility of income function. But since
this function when unconstrained is not a maximum value function, it is not
the envelope of the corresponding function when constrained, and therefore
the PRE need not be positive.
Neary and Roberts (1980) introduced the concepts of virtual price and in-
come in modern microeconomics to analyse the e¤ects of quantity constraints
on consumer behaviour under certanty. I show these concepts are also useful
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to trace out the e¤ects on attitudes towards risk and result in expressions
that can easily be calibrated using information on income and compensated
price elasticities. To illustrate, I carry out such a calibration for two sets of
empirical studies: household demand for durables and labour supply. In the
case of constraints on labour supply, I nd small price risk e¤ects that are
o¤set by endogenously changing risk aversion e¤ects due to a 10% underem-
ployment constraint. The small size of these e¤ects is due to the low income
elasticity of labour supply. Also the PRE on relative prudence is small and
positive. In case of underemployment, it is enhanced by the endogenously
changing prudence e¤ect. For durables, the PRE for risk aversion is strong,
and enforced by the ECRAE if a household is prevented from expanding the
durable good to its optimal levelvice versa the ECRAE will mitigate the
PRE when the household cannot downscale the durable good to its optimal
level. The evidence on the PRE for prudence is mixed (i.e., both positive
or negative). The endogenously changing prudence e¤ect is negative: being
prevented from expanding the durable stock raises relative prudence.
In addition to calibrating local e¤ects of quantity constraints on atti-
tudes towards risk, I explore the global e¤ects by restricting preferences to
the CES-CRRA class. I show that relative risk aversion and prudence, when
constrained, are weighted averages of the corresponding measures when un-
constrained and the elasticity of substitution. I then provide conditions
under which relative risk aversion when constrained can be lower than when
unconstrained, and when a constraint may turn a prudent consumer into an
imprudent one. I illustrate these results using numerical examples. These
show that constraints have nonmonotone and pronounced non-linear e¤ects
on attitudes towards risk.
The subject of the present paper is related to recent work on how fric-
tions and constraints a¤ect risk taking behaviour or the willingness to take
risk and the normative implications this may have for contract design. For
example, Chetty and Szeidl (2007) show within an expected utility model
how the presence of consumption commitments may make the indirect util-
ity function more concave in some income regions, but convex in others.
They explore how this may help to reconcile a number of empirical puzzles,
such as the simultaneous purchasing of insurance and lottery tickets, or the
presence of substantial aversion towards moderate gambles without implying
unrealistically high aversion towards large gambles. Drawing an a similar
observation as Chetty and Szeidl, Postlewaite et al. (2008) show that e¢ -
cient employment contracts should allow for layo¤s when consumer/workers
make consumption commitments. A contract that allows for layo¤s in case
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of a negative productivity shock balances the desire for wage smoothing of
committed workers with the moral hazard constraint that in bad states the
wage cannot exceed marginal productivity. Moreover, because consumption
commitments introduce a non-concavity in the indirect utility function, the
consumer prefers to bear the ensuing employment risk (and a smooth high
wage if employed throughout) to a smooth but low wage under a tenure
contract. The strength of this argument, and the optimal degree of wage
rigidity dependsamong other thingon the e¤ect of consumption commit-
ments on risk aversion. It is an empirical question how strong the e¤ects
are and the expressions that I derive in this paper will allow to assess their
size without requiring particular assumptions on preferences. Gollier (2009)
considers a general dynamic choice problem and asks whether an agent who
can choose a lottery and take some action after observing the outcome of
the lottery, has a larger willingness to bear risks than an agent who has
to commit to an action before observing the lottery outcome. Gollier de-
rives a set of su¢ cient conditions for the exible context to lead to a higher
risk tolerance. He then examines how rigidities may induce a household to
more risk-prone behaviour in portfolio allocation and/or savings decisions.
While the present paper addresses a similar question, its focus is very dif-
ferent. Golliers focus is on decision taking under risk: does the ability to
postpone an action until the uncertainty is resolved always lead to more risk
taking? In the present paper, I examine the e¤ect of one particular set of
constraintsquantity constraints on purchased levels of goods and services
on the willingness to accept small income risks, and decompose it in terms
of consumer preferences. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is also
the rst to examine the consequences of constraints for the decision makers
rate of prudence and thus her willingness to change precautionary behaviour
when background risk increases.
Section 2 provides a mean variance analysis of the PRE on risk aversion,
and indicates why this e¤ect may be counteracted by the ECRAE. Section
3 gives a reminder of the consumers decision problem, its properties, and
formulates the coe¢ cients of risk aversion and prudence with respect to in-
come risk in terms of the direct utility function. In section 4, I introduce
quantity constraints and derive their e¤ect on the consumers aversion with
respect to income risks using the virtual price approach. Section 5 uses the
same approach to look at the e¤ect of a quantity constraint on the degree
of relative prudence. In Section 6, I illustrate these e¤ects for CRRA-CES
preferences. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 7.
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Figure 1: Equivalent income prospects (+,  ), certainty equivalent income
(CE), and implementing CE income (mCE) with a weakly binding quantity
constraint (z = z).
2 A mean-variance argument
In this section, I will explain the e¤ect of a constraint in a simple model
where the consumer cares about two goods (z; x) where the rst is subjected
to a quantity constraint. The price of the z-good is pz, that of the x-good
is normalised to 1. In Figure 1, the Engel curve is drawn as EE (straight
for simplicity). Hence, with an income m, the consumer purchases the
bundle (z;m   pzz). Suppose now that income is uncertain, and takes
the values m+ and m  with equal probability. Without any constraint, the
optimal amounts for the z-good are z+ and z , respectively. But if she is
constrained at z, any income shock must be absorbed by the x-good. Thus
with a negative shock, the consumer ends up at a and with a positive shock
at b. The corresponding utility levels are u and u+, respectively.
I am now interested in computing the certainty equivalent income in the
presence of this constraint. For this purpose, I draw the indi¤erence curves
through a and b and ask which income levels would make the consumer
equally well o¤ when not facing any constraint. The answer is   and +;
I call these the equivalent incomes.
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Let F (z; u) be the numéraire function, i.e., the amount of the x-good
the consumer requires to achieve utility level u when given z. Then clearly
m+ = F (z; u+) + pzz. Taking a second order Taylor approximation of the
right-hand side around z+ gives
m+ ' + + Fz(z+; u+) + pz (z   z+) + 1
2
Fzz(z
+; u+)(z   z+)2
= +   1
2
1
kBzz
(z   z+)2; (1)
where the equality sign comes from the fact that the slope of the indi¤erence
curve at B,  Fz(z+; u+), equals the price pz, and that Fzz is (minus) the
inverse of the own Hicksian price e¤ect on the z-good, kzz. Since z and
z+ are the optimal amounts for incomes m and +, respectively, we have
z  z+ = zBm  (m  +) +O((m  +)2) where zm denotes the income e¤ect
for z. Therefore, (1) may also be written as
m+ = +   1
2
 
zBm
2
kBzz
(m  +)2 +O((m  +)3):
Likewise,
m  =     1
2
 
zAm
2
kAzz
(m   )2 +O((m   )3):
The mean and variance of the prospect (+;  ; 1
2
; 1
2
) are then given by2
E ' m+ 1
2
(zCm)
2
kCzz
"2 +O("3), and var = "2 +O("3);
where superscript C indicates evaluation at a bundle on the Engel curve
somewhere between A and B.
Suppose the consumers degree of absolute risk aversion at expected in-
comem is AR. Then the certainty equivalent income, CE, is approximately
CE ' E  AR
2
var = m+
1
2
 
zCm
2
kCzz
"2   AR(m)
2
"2:
2Note that m    ' "+m+   + ' "  12
(zBm)
2
kBzz
(m  +)2 where the second approx-
imation follows from (1) and z   z+ ' zBm(m   +). Because +  m = " + O("2), it
follows that (m  +)2 = "2 +O("3); and (m   )2 = "2 +O("3).
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CE is the certainty equivalent income that in the absence of any constraint
yields Eu. But since the consumer is constrained, what is needed is the
certain income level that in the presence of the constraint z yields Eu. I
call this the implementing certainty equivalent income and denote it asm
CE.
Transforming CE into mCE can be done in a similar way as in (1):
mCE ' CE   1
2
1
kDzz
(z   zCE)2:
But since z   zCE ' zDm(m   CE) and m   CE = O("2), it follows that
mCE   CE = O("4), and thus can be ignored.
I can now ask what is the implied degree of absolute risk aversion when
having expected incomem and being constrained at z, AR. Since absolute
risk aversion is approximately twice the risk premium per unit of variance,
the answer is
AR ' 2
"2
 
m  CE = 2
"2
 
AR
2
"2   1
2
 
zCm
2
kCzz
"2
!
= AR 
 
zCm
2
kCzz
:
I summarise this as
Claim 1 When the constraint is weakly binding (i.e., coinciding with the
optimal demand for the z-good at the expected income level) the variance
of equivalent income is (almost) the same, but the expected value is lower.
Hence, certainty equivalent income is lower and risk aversion has a mark up
of  (z
C
m)
2
kCzz
to risk aversion in the absence of a constraint.
Suppose next that the quantity constraint is slightly increased: from
z to z. As Figure 2 shows, the equivalent income in the high income
state increases, while that in the low income state falls by approximately the
same amount. Hence the variance of  increases, while the mean is almost
constant. Consequently, expected utility, and certainty equivalent income
fall: @
CE
@z
< 0.
Again, what is of interest is how the implementing certainty equivalent
income is a¤ected. The answer is3
@mCE
@z
=
@CE
@z
  1
kzz
(z   zCE)

1  zm@
CE
@z

:
3Since mCE(z) ' CE   12 1kzz (z   zCE)2 = CE   12 1kzz (zm(m   CE) + z   z)2,
di¤erentiating with respect to z then gives the result.
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Figure 2: Equivalent income prospect (+;  ), certainty equivalent income
(CE), and implementing CE income (mCE) with a strictly binding quantity
constraint z.
If z is a normal good, the large round bracket term takes a positive value.
Since kzz < 0, the second right-hand side term may o¤set the rst term and
increase the implementing certainty equivalent income (as it does in Figure
2: mCE > mCE). In particular, this will happen when the elasticity of
substitution between the two goods is very small. The opposite is true for
a quantity constraint z slightly below z. Now the variance of equivalent
income falls (the mean is approx. una¤ected), hence CE rises. But the
implementing certainty equivalent income mCE may fall if the substitution
e¤ect is small. I therefore make
Claim 2 When the Hicksian substitution e¤ect is small enough, forced con-
sumption will lower risk aversion, while rationing will increase it.
Since the compensated wage e¤ect on labour supply is typically small,
Claim 2 means that when a worker is underemployed (forced consumption
of leisure) she may become less risk averse than when constrained at the
optimal number of hours, or even when not constrained at all, as I illustrate
in the calibration exercise in Section 4.
The claims in this section relied on a mean-variance argument. I con-
sidered the consequences for absolute risk aversion, but not for relative risk
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aversion, nor for relative prudence, and I assumed absolute risk aversion to
be independent of income. The remainder of the paper will take up these
issues in a rigorous way.
3 Income risk aversion and prudence without
quantity constraints
A consumer cares about n commodities whose quantities are given by the
bundle q 2 Rn+. Let the price vector be certain and given by p 2 Rn+: The
consumers income em, however, is random with expectation m and variance
2m. Her preferences are represented by a cardinal Bernoulli utility function
u() which is monotone and strongly concave.
Suppose that the consumer is informed about the income draw before
she makes her consumption decision. Suppose as well that the income draw
coincides with the expected income m.4 Her problem is then to solve
max
q
u(q) s.t. p0q = m ():
Let the unique solution be given by the bundle q(p;m) satisfying the rst
order conditions5
uq(q(p;m)) = (p;m) p; (2)
where (p;m) is the equilibrium value of the Lagrange multiplier.
The local properties of q(p;m) are well known but repeated here for future
reference. Dening K as the matrix of Slutsky substitution e¤ects and qm
as the vector of income e¤ects, we have:
(i) p0qm = 1; (ii)
@q
@p0
= K   qmq0; (iii) K = K 0, (3)
(iv) Kp = 0, and (v) y0Ky < 0 for y 6= p ( real scalar).
Expression (3-ii) is the Slutsky decomposition. A similar decomposition of
the price e¤ect on the marginal utility of income, , is
@
@p
=  mq   qm: (4)
4This is for notational convenience, since I will later evaluate the risk aversion measures
at m =Eem.
5Subscripts with u (and with , q and v below) denote derivatives.
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The rst right-hand side term is a real income e¤ect that can be neutralized
by an appropriate change in income. The second right-hand side term is a
substitution e¤ect: the change in the marginal utility of income when the
consumer is compensated so as to remain at the same utility level.
The indirect utility function is dened as v(p;m) def= u(q(p;m)) and sat-
ises vm = (p;m). Di¤erentiating both sides of (2) with respect to m, and
making use of the adding-up property (3-(i)) gives vmm = m = q0muqqqm.
Since  = q0muq, the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion, mea-
suring twice the risk premium the consumer is willing to pay (per unit of
variance) to get rid of the income risk, is given by
AR(p;m)
def
=  vmm
vm
=  q
0
muqqqm
q0muq
: (5)
This expression may be added to Hanochs list of alternative representations
of relative risk aversion (Hanoch, 1977, Theorem 1).
When the consumer faces an uninsurable income risk but can take actions
to mitigate this risk, Kimballs (1990) coe¢ cient of absolute prudence mea-
sures the sensitivity of these actions to the risk. When the action and the
income risk enter the utility on equal terms (as in the case of future uncertain
income and savings), this coe¢ cient of absolute prudence is dened as
AP (p;m)
def
=  vmmm
vmm
; (6)
and an increase in risk is said to trigger prudent behaviour if AP (p;m) > 0.
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) have shown more generally that a decision
maker is prudent if and only if she prefers to subject her income to the lottery
( k;e"; 1
2
; 1
2
) rather than to the lottery (0; k+e"; 1
2
; 1
2
), for any loss k and any
a zero mean risk e". Thus she prefers to disaggregate the two painsrather
than to face them both in the same state of the world.
For a consumer who cares about many goods, one would expect that
AP (p;m) depends on the set of third (cross) derivatives of the utility function
u(). This is indeed the case. In the appendix, I show that
AP (p;m) =  
@q0muqqqm
@q0 qm
q0muqqqm
; (7)
where @q
0
muqqqm
@q0 is the e¤ect on the quadratic form q
0
muqqqm because of a
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perturbation in the Hessian following dq.6 Expression (7) thus reveals that
the coe¢ cient of absolute prudence for income risk can be expressed as the
ratio of a cubic form in the (three dimensional) array of third derivatives of
u() to a quadratic form in the Hessian of u().
Proposition 1 When a consumer has a utility function u() dened over n
commodities, the coe¢ cients of absolute risk aversion and prudence are given
by (5) and (7), respectively.
Later in the paper, my main concern will be with the e¤ect of quantity
constraints on the degree of relative risk aversion and prudence, which are
dened as RR(p;m) def= AR(p;m)m and PR(p;m) def= AP (p;m)m, respec-
tively. In this respect, it is useful to know how these measures are a¤ected
by an m-compensated increase in the price of good i. In the appendix, I
prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1 The m-compensated e¤ects of pi on RR and RP are
@RR(p;m)
@ log pi
jdv=0 = piqi
m

RR(p;m)

1  @qi
@m
m
qi

+
@2qi
@m2
m2
qi

; (8)
@RP (p;m)
@ log pi
jdv=0 = piqi
m

RP (p;m)

1  @qi
@m
m
qi

(9)
+

3  RP
RR

@2qi
@m2
m2
qi
  1
RR
@3qi
@m3
m3
qi

:
The term @
2qi
@m2
m2
qi
measures the curvature of the Engel curve for good i;
@3qi
@m3
m3
qi
is the third order counterpart. If (8) [(9)] is zero for all i then relative
risk aversion [prudence] is constant along the indi¤erence curve (but can
vary along an Engel curve).7 Clearly, this will be the case with homothetic
preferences (when all Engel curves are straight lines through the origin).
6With two goods, we have @uqq@q0 =

u111 u121
u211 u221
...
u112 u122
u212 u222

, and the numerator
of (7) is the binary cubic form q3m1u111 + 3q
2
m1qm2u112 + 3qm1q
2
m2u122 + q
3
m2u222:
7The case of constant RR along the indi¤erence curve was rst studied by Deschamps
(1973, section 3). Hanoch (1977, section 3) completed the analysis, by deriving the indirect
utility function that corresponds to this assumption.
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4 E¤ects of quantity constraints on risk aver-
sion
4.1 Virtual coe¢ cient of risk aversion
Suppose now that q =
 
x
z

, p =
 
px
pz

and that the consumer can no longer
choose the sub-bundle z which is xed at z. Her problem then turns into
max
x
u(x; z) s.t. p0xx+ p
0
zz = m (
r):
Let the solution be given by xr(p;m; z), satisfying the rst order condition
ux = 
rpx. The indirect utility function is now vr(p;m; z)
def
= u(xr(p;m; z); z).
Repeating the procedure of section 2, the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion
for income risk is given by
AR(p;mjz) def=  v
r
mm
vrm
=  x
r0
muxxx
r
m
xr0mux
: (10)
In order to relate AR(p;mjz) to AR(p;m), I will use the virtual price
approach of Neary and Roberts (1980). This consists in dening a virtual
price vector z for the sub-bundle z, and adjusting the consumers income
to the virtual income level mv def= m + (z   pz)0z such that the consumers
notional demand for that bundle coincides with the imposed quantities. That
is,
z  z(px; z;m+ (z   pz)0z); (11)
xr(px; pz;m; z)  x(px; z;m+ (z   pz)0z); (12)
vr(px; pz;m; z)  v(px; z;m+ (z   pz)0z): (13)
Implicitly di¤erentiating (11) and using the Slutsky equation (3-ii) shows
that
@z
@m
=  K 1zz zm; (14)
where zm is the vector of income e¤ects for sub-bundle z and Kzz is the block
in K related to z, i.e., Kzz = @z@p0z + zmz
0. Intuitively, the consumer would
like to respond to a marginal income increase by dz = zmdm. However, the
quantity constraints prevents her from doing so, and therefore the virtual
prices of that bundle have to go up with  K 1zz dz =  K 1zz zmdm. The
constraint translates the income risk into price risks.
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The marginal utility of income is then
vrm  (v0z + vmz0)
@z
@m
+ vm = vm;
where the equality sign follows from Roys identity. Di¤erentiating one more
time with respect to m yields
vrmm  v0mz
@z
@m
+ vmm(1 + z
0@z
@m
)
=  vmmz0@z
@m
  vmz0m
@z
@m
+ vmm(1 + z
0@z
@m
)
= vmm   vmz0m
@z
@m
; (15)
where the second equality follows upon using (4). Use of (14) the leads to:
Theorem 2 When facing the quantity constraints z, the absolute degree of
risk aversion can be decomposed into a virtual absolute degree risk aversion
and a positive ordinal term:
AR(p;mjz) = AR(px; z;mv)  z0mK 1zz zm: (16)
The rst term on the right hand side of (16) can be coined the virtual
coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. It corresponds to twice the risk premium
per unit of variance in case the consumer is facing a small risk around the
virtual income mv, that can be traded for commodities at the price vector
(px; z). Since Kzz is a negative denite matrix, so is its inverse. Therefore
the quadratic form z0mK
 1
zz zm is strictly negative (and entirely ordinal).
The result that absolute risk aversion under quantity constraints exceeds
virtual absolute risk aversion can be explained as follows. Ideally, the con-
sumer would like to respond to a small deviation in income, dm, from its ex-
pected value, by increasing the demand for z commodities with dz = zmdm.
Since this is not feasible, the virtual price vector of z-goods increases with
dz =  K 1zz zmdm. This price increase has a double e¤ect on the marginal
utility of income: d =  mz0dz   z0mdz. The rst e¤ect is the change
in marginal utility because real income falls, while the second e¤ect is the
compensated price e¤ect on marginal utility. The rst e¤ect is eliminated,
however, because the consumers virtual income, m + (z   pz)0z, is by de-
nition adjusted with exactly zdz. Hence, the change in marginal utility
due to the virtual price change is z0mK
 1
zz zmdm, and the relative change in
marginal utility is z0mK
 1
zz zmdm.
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Assume rst that the quantity constraints z are weakly binding, i.e., that
they exactly coincide with z def= z(p;m), the levels the consumer would have
chosen if her income takes the expected value. Then z = pz, mv = m and
the virtual degree of absolute risk aversion reduces to AR(p;m). Proposition
2 then conrms Claim 1.8
Proposition 2 If quantity constraints are weakly binding,
AR(p;mjz) = AR(p;m)  z0mK 1zz zm:
This proposition is a generalization of a result by Drèze and Modigliani
(1972). They considered a consumer deciding about the amount to save
while facing an uncertain future income. They compared the attitudes
towards income risk under two settings: (i) a timeless income risk where
the consumer is informed about her income draw before making her savings
decision, and (ii) a temporal income risk where the savings decision is made
before the income draw is known. Drèze and Modigliani (1972, eq 2.9)
showed that the risk aversion for temporal income risks exceeds that for
timeless income risks by an ordinal term positively related to the (squared)
income e¤ect on current consumption and reciprocally related to the degree
of substitution between current and future consumption. The constraint
arises in the temporal context because savings decision can not respond to
income shocks. Nevertheless, the constraint is weakly binding because the
decision has been made optimally.
I now give a similar decomposition of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aver-
sion under quantity constraints. For this purpose, let z denote the diagonal
matrix with the virtual price vector z on its main diagonal. Eq (16) may
now be rewritten as:
AR(p;mjz) m = AR(px; z;mv) mv m
mv
  z0mz (zKzzz) 1zzm mv
m
mv
:
The left-hand side is the degree of relative risk aversion under rationing,
RR(p;mjz). Dene bz def= zzm; and Szz def= 1mvzKzzz. These are the Rot-
terdam parameterisations of the income and substitution e¤ects, evaluated
at virtual prices and income (cf Theil, 1976). Since my main focus will be
on the relative risk aversion, Theorem 3 is useful:
8Alternatively, Proposition 2 may be seen as an application of the second-order envelope
property of maximum value functions. Cf Dixit (1990, p 113-4).
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Theorem 3 The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion under quantity con-
straints may be decomposed as
RR(p;mjz) = RR(px; z;mv)  b0zS 1zz bz	  mmv : (17)
If the quantity constraints are weakly binding, this relationship reduces
to RR(p;mjz) = RR(p;m)  b0zS 1zz bz. In the next section, I will assess the
di¤erence between RR(p;mjz) and RR(p;m) when these constraints become
strictly binding.
4.2 Strictly binding quantity constraints
I will now identify the four e¤ects that in the introduction were claimed to
make up the ECRA e¤ect. For simplicity, I focus in the remainder on the
case where z is a scalar and use z as a shorthand for z(px; pz;m). If the
consumer is rationed (i.e., z > z) z will exceed pz andmv > m, andmutatis
mutandis with forced consumption (i.e., z < z).
I start from the following identity:
RR(p;mjz) RR(p;m)  [RR(p;mjz) RR(p;m)]+[RR(p;mjz) RR(p;mjz)]
The rst square bracket term is what I called in the introduction the price
risk e¤ect: the e¤ect of being constrained at the optimal level z. The second
one is the endogenously changing risk aversion e¤ect: the e¤ect of having to
consume z rather than z and having to move along the budget line.
Theorems 1-3 provide the tools necessary to quantify both e¤ects. Note
that the Rotterdamresponses bz and szz may also be written as wvzz and
wvzb"zz where wvz is the (virtual) budget share of good z, wvz def= zzmv , and z
and b"zz denote the income and compensated own price elasticity, respectively.
Therefore, (17) can be rewritten as
RR(p;mjz) =

RR(px; z;m
v)  wvz
2zb"zz

m
mv
; (18)
where it should be kept in mind that the behavioural responses (like z
and b"zz) are evaluated at the triple (px; z;mv). The price risk e¤ect is then
obtained by evaluating (18) at (px; pz;m) and subtracting RR(p;m):  wz 
2
zb"zz .
On the other hand, the e¤ect of endogenously changing risk aversion may
be approximated as:
RR(p;mjz) RR(p;mjz) ' dRR(p;mjz)
dz
jz=z (z   z) : (19)
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Thus I can write
RR(p;mjz) RR(p;m) '  wz 
2
zb"zz| {z }+
dRR(p;mjz)
d log z
jz=z| {z }
z   z
z
:
PRE ECRAE
I will now develop an expression for the endogenously changing risk aver-
sion e¤ect in the neighbourhood of the notional demand, dRR(p;mjz)d log z jz=z. I
will do so under
Assumption C In the neighbourhood of the notional demand z, income
and compensated price elasticities are constant.
Expression (18) reveals three channels through which z a¤ectsRR(p;mjz).
First, its virtual counterpart, RR(px; z;mv), changes because z and mv
change:
dRR(px; z;mv)
d log z
=

@RR
@z
+
@RR
@mv
z

z
@ log z
@ log z
+
@RR
@mv
(z   pz) z: (20)
Since I look at the neighbourhood of z, z = pz and the income e¤ect
vanishes. Thus we are left with a compensated price e¤ect. In the appendix,
I show how Theorem 1 and Assumption C allow me to write this e¤ect as
dRR(px; z;mv)
d log z
jz=z = wz(1  z)(z  RR)
wzb"zz ;
where RP  = RP (p;m).
Second, the ratio wvz
2zb"zz will change. Under Assumption C, this will
happen in proportion with wvz . I show in the appendix that
@ logwvz
@ log z
jz=z = 1 + 1  wzb"zz : (21)
Finally, there is the scaling factor m
mv
. I show in the appendix that
@ logmv
@ log z
jz=z = wzb"zz < 0: (22)
Collecting results then gives the following operational expression for the
ECRA-e¤ect:
dRR(p;mjz)
d log z
jz=z = wz(1  z)(z  RR)
wzb"zz (23)
+

 wz 
2
zb"zz

1 +
1  wzb"zz

 RR(p;mjz)wzb"zz :
17
In Table 1, I present for some recent empirical studies reporting on elas-
ticities and budget shares for durable goods, the calibration of the price risk
e¤ect (column 5) andunder the assumption that RR = 2the endogenously
changing risk aversion e¤ect (column 6).
Table 1. Calibration of the price risk e¤ect (PRE) and the endogenously
changing risk aversion/prudence e¤ect (ECRAE/ECPE) for some recent em-
pirical studies on durable goods demand.
z b"zz wz PRERA ECRAEb;c  b PREb;c;dP ECPEb;c;d
1. O lney (1990)
US (1920-83)
1:28  :138 :10 1:22  4:16 5:39  0:54  2:58
2. Pako (forthcom ing)
US (1951:Q1-2001:Q4)
1:50  :247 :13 1:18  1:18 2:14 0:44  1:29
3. Deschamps (1993)
UK (1955:Q1-1983:Q2)
2:98  2:51 :05 0:18 0:11 0:15 0:17 :17
4. Deschamps (2003)
UK (1955:Q1-1997:Q4)
a 3:43  :291 :15 6:05  9:27 15:85  :29  16:30
average
av. excl. 3
2:16
2:82
 3:65
 4:87
0:09
0:06
 4:96
 6:68
av. excl. 3e
av. excl. 3f
 6:04
 3:70
 1:23
0:86
 10:16
 4:67
a The elasticities were calculated on the basis of the reported average budget share
and the posterior medians of the coe¢ cient distributions in Table VI. b Assumingb"zz and z to be locally constant. c Assuming RR= 2. d Assuming RP = 3.
e Assuming RR= 1 and RP = 2. f Asuming RR= 3 and RP = 4.
Olney (1990) estimates a single equation of per capita net investment in
durables in terms of a price index, per capita disposable income and other
variables. Pako (2009) estimates the Euler equation corresponding to an
intertemporal utility maximisation problem where the period utility index
is a generalised CES function (allowing for non-homotheticity) dened over
the service ow of durables and the consumption of non-durables. The
price risk e¤ects for these studies are around 1.2, while they di¤er in terms
of the endogenously changing risk aversion e¤ect, due to a larger value for
jb"zzj in Pako(2009). Deschamps (1993, 2003) estimates a dynamic demand
system of (6 and 9, resp.) commodity groups, one of them being durable
household goods. The budget share of durables in the former study, however,
is suspiciously low (Power (2004: 22), e.g., reports a share around 25% for the
UK). The large income elasticity (3.43) for the second UK study produces
very large values for the two e¤ects. The unweighted table averages for the
two e¤ects are 2:2 and  3:7. Disregarding the 3th row, the averages are 2:8
and  4:9. Being stuck at the optimal service ow thus raises RR on average
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with 2.8, while a 10% reduction of the service ow below its optimal value
further increases relative risk aversion with about :5.
Next, I look at the local e¤ects of a quantity constraint on labour supply.
Like in Section 2, I consider a consumer/worker caring about consumption
and leisure. Labour time is sold at a wage rate a. Non-labour income is y.
The indirect utility function dened on a and y is v(a; y), and the analysis
above can then be repeated to nd that
RR(a; yjL) =

RR(av; yv) +
avL
yv
2Lb"LL

y
yv
; (24)
where av and yv are the virtual wage rate and non-labour income supporting
L as the solution to the standard utility maximisation problem, L is the
elasticity of labour supply w.r.t. non-labour income, b"LL is the compensated
wage elasticity, and RR(a; y) def=  vyy(a;y)y
vy
.
Under Assumption C, I show in the appendix that
d
 
RR(a; yjL)
d logL
jL=L =
aL
yb"LL (L   1) (RR + L) (25)
+
2Lb"LL aL

y
 
1 +
1 + aL

yb"LL
!
+

RR +
aL
y
2Lb"LL
 aL
yb"LL ;
where RR is a shorthand for RR(a; y) and L is the otpimal labour supply
under certainty. Again, the rst term is the compensated e¤ect on RR(a; y),
the second term is the e¤ect on the PRE-term, and the third term is the e¤ect
through the scaling factor y
yv
.
Note that when L ! 0 both the PRE (aLy
2Lb"LL ) the ECRAE (d(RR(a;yjL))d logL jL=L)
vanish, though the latter at a smaller rate (since it is O(L)). If labour sup-
ply is perfectly income inelastic, preferences are quasi-linear in consumption.
Then all income shocks are ideally absorbed by consumption and restric-
tions on labour supply do not prevent that. Hence there is no e¤ect on risk
aversion.
Chetty (2006, Table 1) collects the values for aL

y
, b"LL, and L from 14
empirical studies on labour supply in US/Europe. On the basis of these
data, I calculate in Table 2 aL

y
2Lb"LL (column 5), as well as the right-hand side
of (25) under the assumption that RR = 2 (column 6) in Table 2.
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Table 2. Calibration of the price risk e¤ect (PRE) and the endogenously
changing risk aversion/prudence e¤ect (ECRAE/ECPE) using Chettys (2006)
collection of labour supply elasticities.
Row in Chetty
(2006, Table 1)
L b"LL aLy a PRERA ECRAEb;c  b PREP b;c;d ECPEb;c;d
1  :020 :130 1:99 :006  :06 :014 :016  1:01
2  :120 :567 1:977 :050 :12 :107 :125  1:15
3  :010 :035 4:145 :012 1:98 :004 :020  3:07
4  :030 :192 4:632 :022 :48 :031 :048  1:52
5  :040 :088 :408 :007  :02 :016 :019  :61
6  :297 :545 :707 :114 :35 :240 :276  :94
7  :185 :301 :513 :058 :19 :117 :142  :80
8  :008 :033 :815 :002  :07 :004 :004  :72
9  :038 :288 :137 :001  :01 :002 :002  :090
10  :110 1:040 2:025 :024  :05 :061 :065  :82
11  :110 :660 2 :037 :02 :085 :096  1:04
12  :278 :646 :394 :047 :06 :121 :128  :57
13  :251 :432 2 :291 2:78 :187 :463  3:11
14  :222 :375 2:007 :264 2:87 :137 :410  3:35
av. (st. dev.)  :12 (11) :067 (:094) :62 (1:07) :13 (:15)  1:34 (1:04)
av. (st. dev.)e
av. (st. dev.)f
1:10 (1:46)
:13 (:70)
:13 (:13)
:13 (:16)
 1:53 (1:94)
 1:57 (:97)
a The value of aL

y
is implicitly available from Chettys (2006) Table 1 as 1 b"LL
L

value in his column (6). b Assuming b"LL and L to be constant. c Assuming
RR= 2. d Assuming RP = 3. e Assuming RR= 1 and PR= 2. f Assuming
RR= 3 and PR= 4.
Compared with Table 1, PRE and ECRAE have a smaller order of mag-
nitude. This is due to the fact that the typical income elasticity is small (the
average is  :12). For 9 out of 14 studies, the ECRA e¤ect is positive, mean-
ing that an underemployment constraint makes the worker less risk averse.
The average positive ECRAE is around 1, i.e., being underemployed for 10%
reduces RR with 0:1. For the whole sample, the average ECRAE is 10
times larger than the average PRE. Taken at face value, this means that the
average worker, when being underemployed for 10% is not more risk averse
than when she can choose hours of work freely. While this conclusion rests
on two assumptionsa base rate relative risk aversion of 2 and locally con-
stant income and Hicksian wage elasticities of labour supplyit shows one
cannot take for granted that people in an underemployment status are less
willing to take risks. In fact, if RR = 1, then ECRAE equals 1:1 (last row),
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and a 10% underemployment constraint lowers RR (with :11  :07 = :04).
The analysis in this section has shown that the e¤ect of a local quantity
constraint on relative income risk aversion is intricate. A fortiori, this will
be the case when leaving the neighbourhood of the notional demand/supply.
In section 5, I will illustrate the global behaviour of RR(p;mjz) when the
elasticity of substitution is constant.
5 Prudence with a quantity constraint
To investigate the e¤ect of quantity constraints on the coe¢ cients of pru-
dence, I continue to assume that such constraint only applies to a single
good (z). In the appendix, it is shown that
vrmmm = vmmm   3vmmzm
@z
@m
  vm 
m2
; (26)
where  is a dimensionless term collecting all second orderordinal responses:

def
=

2zmm
@z
@m
   z2m   zmz   zmmz (@z@m )2 + zm@2z@m2

m2: (27)
Dividing (26) through by (15) leads to
Theorem 4 When facing a quantity constraint, the coe¢ cient of absolute
prudence is given by
AP (p;mjz) def=  v
r
mmm
vrmm
=
AR 

AP   3 z2m
kzz

AR  z2m
kzz
  
AR  z2m
kzz
1
(mv)2
; (28)
where all right-hand side terms are evaluated at (px; z;mv).
Multiplying through by m gives the corresponding expression for the co-
e¢ cient of relative prudence under a quantity constraint:
Corollary 1 Under a quantity constraint, the coe¢ cient of relative prudence
is given by
RP (p;mjz) def=  v
r
mmm
vrmm
m =
RR 

RP   3 b2z
szz

RR  b2z
szz
m
mv
  
RR  b2z
szz
m
mv
: (29)
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As with relative risk aversion, I decompose the e¤ect of a constraint as
RP (p;mjz) RP (p;m) ' [RP (p;mjz) RP (p;m)]+dRP (p;mjz)
d log z
jz=z z   z

z
:
The square bracket term is a price risk e¤ect (but now of the marginal
utility of income function), while the next term is an endogenously changing
prudence e¤ect. The former e¤ect is no longer unambiguously positive.
This can be seen by evaluating (29) at (px; pz;m) and subtracting RP  =
RP (p;m):
RP (p;mjz) RP  = wz
2zb"zz (RP    3RR)  
RR   wz 2zb"zz
: (30)
Making use of Assumption C, I show in the appendix that
 = wz
2zb"2zz (b"zz(3  z)  zwz(2 + z) + z) : (31)
Table 1, column 7, gives the corresponding values for  , all of which are
positive. This tends to make the PRE negative. But unless PR is large
relative to RR, this tendency is reversed. Indeed, with CRRA preferences,
RP  = RR + 1, so that RP  > 3RR i¤RR < 1
2
, which is empirically not
very likely (e.g., Barsky et al., 1997). Column 8 of Table 1 gives the price
risk e¤ect for prudence on the assumption that RP  = 3. In the appendix, I
develop an expression for dRP (p;mjz)d log z jz=z; its evaluation is presented in column
9. On average, the PRE is small, but this is due to the diverging numbers for
the individual studies. The Olney gures suggest that short run constraints
on the service ows of durables make the degree of relative prudence fall
with around :5, while the Pakogures predict an increase with around :4.
The ECPE gures for the US are negative (i.e., forced consumption reduces
prudence) but small. Deschamps(2003) elasticities for the UK imply a PRE
on prudence of  :3, but a strong ECPE such that a 10% forced consumption
reduces RP from an assumed value of 3 down to with 1:9.
In Table 2 (columns 8 and 9), I have reported on the corresponding mea-
sures for the 14 labour supply studies. All price risk e¤ects for prudence
(column 8) are positive, while all endogenously changing prudence e¤ects
(column 9) are negative.9 On average, and in absolute value, the latter is
9PRE is now given by RP (a; yjL)  RP  =  shL
2Lb"LL (RP 3RR)+
RR+shL
2
Lb"LL
, where (assuming
constant b"LL and L)  = shL 2Lb"2LL (b"LL(3  L) + shLL(2 + L) + L). The expression
for dRP (a;yjL)
d logL
jL=L is developed in the appendix.
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about 10 times as large as the former, just like in the case of relative risk
aversion. All else equal, the degree of relative prudence for a worker who is
underemployed for 10% exceeds the degree for an unconstrained worker with
about 1
4
. This conclusion is insensitive to the assumption on RR and RP 
(cf. last two rows).
6 CRRA-CES preferences and examples
In this section, I explore the global e¤ects of quantity constraints onRR(p;mjz)
and RP (p;mjz) by imposing more structure on preferences. In particular, I
will assume a CES utility function homogenous of degree 1  :
u(x; z) =
1
1   [x
 + (1  )z] 1  ;
( 1 <   1, 0 <  < 1, and  > 0). Denote  def= 1
1  as the elasticity of
substitution and
x(x; z)
def
=
x
x + (1  )z
as the intensity of consumption of the x-good (with a similar denition for
z). Then it is well known that in equilibrium the marginal budget share bx
equals the average budget share wx, which in turn equals x.
By construction, this utility function has RR =  and RP =  + 1. I
show in the appendix that
RR(p;mjz)  wx =

x + z
1


, and (32)
PR(p;mjz)  wx =
 
x z
 axx axz
axz azz

x
z

; (33)
where axx = (1 + ), axz = 12
1

(2  1

+ 3) and azz = 1 (1 +
1

).
Consider rst (32). The right-hand side is a weighted average of the
relative risk aversion when unconstrained, and the inverse of the elasticity of
substitution. Since x
wx
= m
mv
, (32) can be rewritten as
RR(p;mjz) =

 +
1

wvz
1  wvz

m
mv
: (34)
In terms of the previous discussion, the ordinal term 1

wvz
1 wvz corresponds
to the PRE. The ECRA e¤ect of a change in z consists of two components:
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the fact that the PRE is variable and depends on z,10 and the scaling factor
m
mv
. The CRRA assumption e¤ectively shuts down the income and relative
price e¤ects of a change in the quota on RR. Thus, two factors regulate the
relationship between RR(p;mjz) and . One is the degree of substitutability
between the z-good and the other commodity. The lower this degree, the
higher is the second, ordinal, term. Intuitively, a high substitution elasticity
allows one to "work around" the constraint easily by consuming other goods.
The other is the relationship between nominal income m and virtual income
mv. If the consumer is forced to consume more than her ideal demand, then
z < pz and mv < m. In this case, RR(p;mjz) will exceed  both because
of a low degree of substitutability and because of forced consumption. On
the other hand, if the consumer is rationed in the sense that her notional
demand exceeds z, then z > pz and mv > m. The coe¢ cient RR(p;mjz)
then falls below  whenever
1

zz
pxx
< 
mv  m
mv
:
Since m
v m
mv
= zz pzz
pxx+zz
< zz
pxx
, a necessary condition for this to happen is
1

< .
The right-hand side of (33) is a weighted average of the elements of the
symmetric matrix (aij). The terms axx and azz measure the baserate of
prudence and the di¢ culty to substitute, respectively; they are clearly non-
negative. If   1
2+3
, then axz  0 and the quadratic form is positive
for any x 2 [0; 1]. On the other hand, if  < 12+3 , then axz < 0 and the
quadratic form will become negative for some x 2 [0; 1] if the corresponding
determinant is negative. The solid lines in gure 3 delineate the regions
where det(aij) takes a positive or negative sign. Pairs of (; ) below the
dashed line result in axz < 0. Hence, combinations of (; ) below the lower
solid line will for some x > 0 result in a negative value for the quadratic
form 0A.11 This means that for some z, the quantity constrained consumer,
while still risk averse, has become imprudent.
Proposition 3 With CRRA-CES preferences, for every value of RR > 0,
(i) there exists a su¢ ciently high elasticity of substitution , such that for
some level of the quantity constraint z (< z), RR(p;mjz) < RR, and (ii)
there exists a su¢ ciently low , such that for some level of the quantity
constraint z, PR(p;mjz) < 0.
10Unless  = 1 (Cobb-Douglas) in which case wvz  1  .
11The expression for the boundary line is  = 18
4+5 p24+25
1+ .
24
(+)
(+)
(-)
(-)
(-)
Figure 3: Regions for positive and negative denitness of the quadratic form
(33).
I conclude this section with two examples. In both examples,  = 1
2
,
m = 10 and px = pz = 1, so that the notional demand for each good is
5 units, and the budget shares when unconstrained equal 1
2
. In the rst
example, illustrated in gure 4,  = 2 and  = 2. The solid bold lines
show RR(p;mjz) (left) and PR(p;mjz) (right). The horizontal dotted lines
represent  (left) and +1 (right). The solid tin line and the dashed tin line
correspond to the rst and second right-hand side terms in (18) and (29).
If the quantity constraint on z is less than 2.95 units, the consumer turns
less risk averse than without facing any constraint at all: the endogenous
diminishing risk aversion e¤ect has overtaken the price risk e¤ect. And once
it falls below 2 units, she also becomes less prudent.
The next example, shown in gure 5, is for  = 1
5
and  = 1
2
. Again, the
ideal amount of the z-good is 5 units. Now, both RR(p;mjz) and RP (p;mjz)
display a pronounced non-monotone behaviour in z. A comparison with
gure 4 shows that this is due to the behaviour of the response term. That
RR(p;mjz) is falling in the neighbourhood of 5 units squares with Claim 2
made in section 2. Relative prudence falls below the baserate for z-values
above the notional demand, i.e., with forced consumption.
Figures 4 and 5 may give the impression that when the constraint is
weakly binding, relative prudence always exceeds its base rate. This im-
pression is incorrect. Indeed, if m = 10, pz = :55334,  = :75,  = :2,
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Figure 4: Relative risk aversion (left) and relative prudence (right):  =
2;  = 2. Notional demand for z is 5.
Figure 5: Relative risk aversion (left) and relative prudence (right):  =
1
2
;  = 1
5
. Notional demand for z is 5.
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and  = :3, the optimal demands are x = 6:667 and z = 6:024. When
z = z, the response term  vanishes and PR(p;mjz) = :9428 + 0 < 1 + :3.
Furthermore, if z = 7 (i.e., mild forced consumption), then PR(p;mjz) =
1:357  1:908 =  :551.
These examples, and the discussion in the preceding section, illustrate
that even with very regularpreferences, quantity constraints have intricate
e¤ects on the degrees of relative risk aversion and prudence. Stated di¤er-
ently, (income) insurance and the z-good can be both complements, as well
as substitutes, depending on the level of the constraint. And the presence of
a quantity constraint may both enhance and lower the precautionary savings
motive.
7 Conclusion
I have traced out how quantity constraints on one or more goods or services
a¤ect the consumers attitude towards income risk. Using the virtual price
approach, I have decomposed the e¤ect into a price risk e¤ect and an endoge-
nously changing risk aversion/prudence e¤ect, and shown how these can be
measured using information on price and income elasticities and relative de-
grees of risk aversion/prudence. Calibrations using empirical studies on the
demand for durables and labour supply have illustrated the sign and order
of magnitude of the two e¤ects.
In addition, for CRRA-CES preferences, I identied conditions under
which a quantity constraint may turn a consumer less risk averse or impru-
dent, and showed that the relationship between the degree of relative risk
aversion/relative prudence, and the quantity constraint can easily become
very non-monotonic.
In recent years, a literature has developed to explain the empirical varia-
tion in measures of risk aversion (e.g., Barsky et al. 1997, Guiso and Paiella,
2008, Aarbu and Schroyen, 2009) and prudence (e.g., Deck and Schlesinger,
2010) by regressing these measures on socioeconomic characteristics of the
decision maker. I believe the ndings in this paper show that the employ-
ment status of a worker/consumer, the imperfect malleability of durables,
and transaction costs more generally, all may contribute to a persons atti-
tude towards risk, and not necessarily in a uniform manner. This suggests
one should account for these e¤ects as much as possible to avoid imprecise
and even inconsistent estimates of the parameters of interest.
27
The e¤ects of employment constraints on attitudes towards risk obvi-
ously have macroeconomic applications. If the anticipation of future quan-
tity constraints impacts on the degrees of risk aversion and prudence, this
will trigger changes in the optimal amount of savings (see, e.g., Bauer and
Buchholz, 2008) of which the macroeconomic e¤ects may conrm the expec-
tation. Therefore, a better understanding of these impacts is also relevant
for studying the nature of underemployment equilibria.
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Appendix
Derivation of (7)
Since m = q0muqqqm, di¤erentiating both sides with respect to m yields
mm = 2q
0
muqqqmm +
@q0muqqqm
@q0
qm
where @q
0
muqqqm
@q0 is the e¤ect on the quadratic form q
0
muqqqm because of a
perturbation in the Hessian following dq. Di¤erentiating the rst order
condition (2) with respect to m yields
mp = uqqqm:
Doing the same with the adding up condition (3-i) gives p0qmm = 0. There-
fore q0muqqqmm = 0 and mm =
@q0muqqqm
@q0 qm. The coe¢ cient of absolute
prudence with respect to income risk is then given by
AP (p;m) =  mm
m
=  
@q0muqqqm
@q0 qm
q0muqqqm
:
Since @q
0
muqqqm
@q0 is the e¤ect on the quadratic form q
0
muqqqm because of a
perturbation in the Hessian following dq, I can write it as
@q0muqqqm
@q0
= [q0m
@uqq
@q1
qm; :::; q
0
m
@uqq
@qn
qm]
= q0m[
@uqq
@q1
qm; :::;
@uqq
@qn
qm]
= q0m|{z}
1n
[
@uqq
@q1|{z}
nn
; :::;
@uqq
@qn|{z}
nn
] (In 
 qm)| {z }
n2n
;
where In is the (n  n) identity matrix and 
 is the Kronecker product
operator. Still another way of writing @q
0
muqqqm
@q0 is
vec(qmq0m)
0@vec(uqq)
@q0
qm:
Proof of Theorem 1: expression (8)
@RR
@pi
=  m
vm

vmmpi  
vmm
vm
vmpi

;
@RR
@m
=  vmm
vm
  m
vm

vmmm   vmm
vm
vmm

:
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To keep utility constant, dpi should be accompanied by dm = qidpi.
Therefore
@RR
@pi
jdv=0 = @RR
@pi
+
@RR
@m
qi
=  m
vm

vmmpi + vmmmqi  
vmm
vm
(vmpi + vmmqi

  vmm
vm
qi:
Since
vmpi = vpim =  vmmqi   vm
@qi
@m
; and
vmmpi = vpimm =  vmmmqi   2vmm
@qi
@m
  vm @
2qi
@m2
;
the previous expression can be written as
@RR
@pi
jdv=0 = vmmm
vm
@qi
@m
+m
@2qi
@m2
  vmmm
vm
qi
m
Multiplying through by pi and making use of the denition of RR and
the fact that @piqi
@m
= piqi
m
@qi
@m
m
qi
then gives (8).
Proof of Theorem 1, expression (9)
@RP
@pi
=   m
vmm

vmmmpi  
vmmm
vmm
vmmpi

@RP
@m
=
vmmm
vmm
  m
vmm

vmmmm   vmmm
vmm
vmmm

Therefore
@RP
@pi
jdv=0 = @RP
@pi
+
@RP
@m
qi
=  m
vm

vmmmpi + vmmmmqi  
vmmm
vmm
(vmmpi + vmmmqi

  vmmm
vmm
qi
Since
vmmmpi = vpimmm =  vmmmmqi   3vmmm
@qi
@m
  3vmm @
2qi
@m2
  vm @
3qi
@m3
;
the previous expression can be written as
@RP
@pi
jdv=0 =  vmmm
vmm
(
qi
m
  @qi
@m
) + (3  vmmmm
vmm
vm
vmmm
)
@2qi
@m2
m+
vmm
vmm
@3qi
@m3
:
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Multiplying through by pi and making use of the denitions of RR and
RP then gives (9).
Derivation of (23)
Totally di¤erentiate (11) with respect to. z to get
dz
dz
= k 1zz [1  zm(z   pz)] ;
so that
d log z
d log z
=
1  @ log z
@ logm
wvz
z pz
z
@ log z
@ log pz
jdu=0
: (35)
Therefore
d log z
d log z
jz = 1@ log z
@ log pz
jdu=0
=
1b"zz : (36)
The e¤ect of a marginal change in z on virtual income mv = m+ (z   pz)z
is given by
@ logmv
@ log z
=
z
mv

@z
@z
z + (z   pz)

= wvz
@ log z
@ log z
+
z
mv
(z   pz); (37)
Evaluating at z = z and making use of (36) then results in
d logmv
d log z
jz = wzb"zz : (38)
By denition, wvz =
zz
mv
= zz
m+(z pz)z . Then
@ logwvz
@ log z
=
@ log z
@ log z
+ 1  @ logm
v
@ log z
: (39)
Evaluating at z = z and making use of (36) and (38) then results in
@ logwvz
@ log z
= 1 +
1  wzb"zz : (40)
When income elasticities are constant,
zm =
z
m
z, and zmm =
z
m2
z(z   1):
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Then for i = z, (8) becomes
@RR
@ log pz
jdv=0 = wz(1  z)(RR   z): (41)
When income and compensated price elasticities are constant,
dRR(p;mjz)
d log z
jz=z = (1  z)(RR   z)
wzb"zz
+

RR   wz 
2
zb"zz

 wzb"zz

  wz 
2
zb"zz

1 +
1  wzb"zz

;
which rearranged gives (23) in the text.
Derivation of (25)
Let shvL be a shorthand for
avL
yv
. Di¤erentiating (24) w.r.t. L gives
dR(a; yjL)
d logL
=

R(a; y) + shvL
2Lb"LL

(  y
yv
)
@ log yv
@ logL
+
2Lb"LL shvL@ log sh
v
L
@ logL
:
Since yv = y + (a  av)L,
@ log yv
@ logL
= (a  av) L
yv
  shvL
@ log av
@ logL
;
and
@ log shvL
@ logL
=

@ log av
@ logL
+ 1  shvL

a  av
av
  @ log a
v
@ logL

:
From implicit di¤erentiation of L = L(av; y + (a  av)L), one gets that
@ log av
@ logL
=
1  shvLL a a
v
avb"LL :
It may be veried that with constant income elasticity @R(a;y)
@ log a
jdv=0 takes
the form
@R(a; y)
@ log a
jdv=0 = shL(L   1)(L +RR(a; y)): (42)
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Collecting results and evaluating at L = L(= L(a; y)) then gives
dR(a; yjL)
d logL
jL=L = (L   1)(L +RR(a; y))
shLb"LL
RR(a; y) + shL
2Lb"LL

shLb"LL + 
2
Lb"LL shL

1 +
1 + shLb"LL

:
Rearranging then gives (25) in the text.
Derivation of (26)
Di¤erentiating (15) with respect to m, gives
vrmmm = vmmz
@z
@m
+ vmmm

1 + z
@z
@m

 (vmm   vmzm@z
@m
)zm
@z
@m
 vm

zmz
@z
@m
+ zmm

1 + z
@z
@m

 vmzm@
2z
@m2
: (43)
Totally di¤erentiating (4) for z with respect to m, gives
vmmz =  2vmmzm   vmzmm   vmmmz:
Then (43) can be written as (26) in the text.
Derivation of (31).
By denition, zm(px; z;mv) = z
z(px;z ;mv)
mv
, where z is assumed to be
constant. Since zmm and zmz are partials of zm (i.e., derivatives w.r.t. 3th
and 2nd argument, respectively), we get
zmm =
z
mv

zm   z
mv

=
zz
(mv)2
(z   1) ;
zmz =
z
mv
zz =
zz
zmv
"zz;
where "zz is the uncompensated own price elasticity.
Recall that @z
@m
=   zm
kzz
=   z
mv
zb"zz . Di¤erentiating w.r.t. m and assumingb"zz and z constant gives
@2z
@m2
=   1
mv
zb"zz

@z
@m
  z
mv

1 +
@z
@m
z

=
z
(mv)2
zb"2zz ((1  wz)z + b"zz) :
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Therefore
2zmm
@z
@m
=  2 zz
(mv)2
(z   1)
z
mv
zb"zz
= 2
wvz
(mv)2
2zb"zz (1  z)
and
z2m   zmz   zmmz =
2zz
2
(mv)2
  zz
zmv
"zz   z
2z
(mv)2
(z   1)
=
2zz
2
(mv)2
  zz
zmv
("zz + wzz   wz)
=
2zz
2
(mv)2
  zz
zmv
(b"zz   wz)
= [z(w
v
z)
2   zwvz (b"zz   wz)] 12z :
Hence
(z2m   zmz   zmmz)

@z
@m
2
= [z(w
v
z)
2   zwvz (b"zz   wz)] 1(mv)2 2zb"2zz :
And nally,
zm
@2z
@m2
=
zz
mv
z
(mv)2
zb"2zz ((1  wz)z   b"zz)
=
wvz
(mv)2
2zb"2zz ((1  wz)z + b"zz) :
Then (27) can be written as
 = wvz
2zb"2zz  2b"zz(1  z)  2zwvz + zb"zz   2zwvz + z + b"zz
= wvz
2zb"2zz (b"zz(3  z)  zwvz(2 + z) + z) ;
which is (31) in the text.
Derivation of the ECP-e¤ect used to compute column 9 in Table 1.
Assuming constant income and price elasticities. The e¤ect of a small
change in z in the neighbourhood of z on RP (p;mjz) is the sum of two
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e¤ects. The rst e¤ect traces the e¤ects because of changes in wvz and mv;
it is given by
RP (p;mjz) =
RR 

RP   3wz 
2
zb"zz

RR  wz 2zb"zz
m
mv
  
RR  wz 2zb"zz
m
mv
:
dRP (p;mjz)
d log z
jpart 1z=z =
 3RRwz 
2
zb"zz   @@ logwz +RP (p;mjz)wz 2zb"zz
RR  wz 2zb"zz
@ logwvz
@ log z
jz=z
 RP (p;mjz)@ logm
v
@ log z
jz=z
where
@
@ logwz
=    w2z
2zb"2zz z(2 + z)
The second e¤ect is the direct e¤ect onRR(px; z;mv) andRP (px; z;mv)
cf (20) and the corresponding expression for RP .
dRP (p;mjz)
d log z
jpart 2z=z =
1
RR  wz 2zb"zz

@RR
@ log z
jdv=0

RP   3wz 
2
zb"zz

+RR
@RP
@ log z
jdv=0
 RP (p;mjz) @RR
@ log z
jdv=0

jz=z 1b"zz ;
where @RR
@ log z
jdv=0 is given by (41) and the corresponding expression for @RP@ log z jdv=0
is obtained from (9) and the fact that when income elasticity is constant then
zmm
m2
z
= z(z   1) and zmmmm3z = z(z   1)(z   2):
@RP
@ log z
jdv=0 = wz(z   1)

3z  
RP
RR
z  
z(z   2)
RR
  PR

:
The gures in Table 1, column 9, are then obtained as dRP (p;mjz)d log z jpart 1z=z +
dRP (p;mjz)
d log z jpart 2z=z .
Derivation of the expressions in footnote 7
First, note that vryy(a; yjL) can be obtained in the same way as (15) and
vryyy(a; yjL) in the same way as (26):
vryy = vyy + vyLy
@av
@y
;
vryyy = vyyy + 3vyyLy
@av
@y
+ vy
 
2Lyy
@av
@y
+ (L2y + Lya   LyyL)

@av
@y
2
+ Ly
@2av
@y2
!
:
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Since Ly = L
L
y
, we have that
Lyy = L
L
(yv)2
(L   1)
Lya =
L
av
L
yv
"LL;
where "LL = b"LL + shLL, the uncompensated wage elasticity.
Furthermore, since @a
v
@y
=  LybLa =  avyv Lb"LL , we have that
@2av
@y2
=
av
(yv)2
Lb"2LL ((1 + shL)L + b"LL) :
Combining results, we obtain:
 v
r
yyy
vryy
y =
RR

PR + 3shvL
2Lb"LL

+ 
RR + shvL
2Lb"LL
 y
yv
;
where
 = shvL
2Lb"2LL (b"LL(3  L) + shLL(2 + L) + L) :
The PRE is then found by evaluating this expression at (a; y) in stead of
(av; yv) and subtracting PR.
The gures obtained in Table 2, column 9 are obtained as the sum of
dRP (a; yjL)
d logL
jpart 1
L=L =
3 RR shL
2Lb"LL + @@ log shL  RP (p;mjz) shL 2Lb"LL
RR + shL
2Lb"LL
@ log shvL
@ logL
jL=L
 RP (a; yjL)@ log y
v
@ logL
jL=L
where
@
@ log shL
=  + sh2L
2Lb"2LLL(2 + 2L)
and
dRP (a; yjL)
d logL
jpart 2
L=L =
1
RR + shL
2Lb"LL

@RR
@ log av
jdv=0

RP + 3shL
2Lb"LL

+RR
@RP
@ log av
jdv=0
 RP (a; yjL) @RR
@ log av
jdv=0

jL=L
1b"LL .
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where @RR
@ log av
jdv=0 is given by (42) and the corresponding expression for @RP@ log av jdv=0
is
@RP
@ log av
jdv=0 = shL(L   1)

 3L +
RP
RR
L +
L(L   2)
RR
+ PR

:
Example with CRRA-CES preferences.
Solving
max
x;z
u(x; z) =
1
1   [x
 + (1  )z] 1 
s.t. pxx+ pzz = m;
yields the notional demands
x(px; pz;m) =


px
 
p1 x + (1  )p1 z
 1
m;
z(px; pz;m) =

1  
pz
 
p1 x + (1  )p1 z
 1
m:
The compensated price elasticity for good z is then
@ log z
@ log pz
jdu=0 =  (1  wz);
where the budget share wz is given by
wz =
pzz(px; pz;m)
m
= (1  )p1 z

p1 x + (1  )p1 z
 1
:
Solving z = z(px; z;m+ (z   pz)z) for z gives
z =
1  

p
1  1

x

m  pzz
z
 1

:
This gives a virtual income
mv = m+
"
1  

p
1  1

x

m  pzz
z
 1

  pz
#
z:
The indirect utility function is
v(p;m; z) =
1
1   [x(z)
 + (1  )z] 1  ;
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where x(z) def= m  pzz. Denote c(z) = [x(z) + (1  )z].
Then
vm = c(z)
1 

 1x(z) 1
vmm = 
2 (1     ) c(z) 1   2x(z)2( 1)
+(  1)c(z) 1   1x(z) 2
vmmm = 
3 (1     ) (1     2) c(z) 1   3x(z)2( 1)
+32 (1     ) (  1)c(z) 1   2x(z)2 3
+(  1)(  2)c(z) 1   1x(z) 3:
vmm can be factored as
vmm = c(z)
1 

 1x(z) 2


x(z)
c(z)
+ (1  )(1  )z

c(z)

= c(z)
1 

 1x(z) 2 fx + (1  )zg
Likewise, vmmm may be factored as
vmmm = c(z)
1 

 1x(z) 3
(
(1     )(1     2)

x(z)
c(z)
2
+3(1     )(  1)x(z)

c(z)
+ (  1)(  2)

= c(z)
1 

 1x(z) 3

(1     )(1     2)x2
+3(1     )(  1)x + (  1)(  2)g :
The curly bracket term is a 2nd degree polynomial in x.
Since z = 1   x, we may ask for which coe¢ cients axx; azz; axz the
quadratic form (x z)
 
axx axz
axz azz
 
x
z

results in the above polynomial. The
answer is axx = (1 + ), axz = 12
1

(2  1

+ 3) and azz = 1 (1 +
1

).
Hence,
 vmm
vm
=
1
x(z)
fx + (1  )zg ;
 vmmm
vmm
=
1
x(z)
(x z)

axx axz
axz azz

x
z

:
Multiplying through by m and noting that wx =
x(z)
m
since px = 1 gives
(32) and (33) in the text.
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